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WHAT, ME WORRY?  THE MULTI-FRONT ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 
ANDREW ASKLAND* 
“Think, every day, something no one else is thinking.  It is bad for the 
mind to be always part of unanimity.”  Christopher Morley1 
There is consistent polling evidence that Americans are concerned about 
their privacy.2  Although poll numbers fluctuate with current events, as 
demonstrated in headlines about the U.S. PATRIOT Act, this underlying 
pattern persists.3  However, there is no clear or comprehensive vision of how 
 
* Andrew Askland (J.D., Ph.D) is Director of the Center for the Study of Law, Science, & 
Technology at the Arizona State University College of Law. 
 1. This often-cited quote is attributed to Christopher Morley, an American editor and author 
living from 1890-1957.  For sources attributing the quoted material to Christopher Morley, see, 
Child Care Exchange, http://www.childcareexchange.com/eed/issue.php?id=377 (last visited Feb. 
14, 2006); Pittsburg Area Brain Injury Alliance, http://www.pabia.org/Archives/Newsletters/ 
Cognitive%20Dissonance/cd_part_vii.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2006); Quote Collection Website, 
http://www.ptf.com/~vlb/Cuute/Quotes/quotes1.txt (last visited Feb. 14, 2006); Quotes by 
Subject, http://www.ifla.org/faife/litter/subject/pluralism.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2006). 
 2. For example, in the Harris Equifax, Health Information Privacy Survey, 75% of 
respondents worried that medical records for a computerized national health information system 
would be used for non-health purposes and 96% believed that federal legislation should designate 
all personal medical information as “sensitive” and impose penalties for unauthorized disclosures.  
Health Information Privacy Survey, HARRIS EQUIFAX 11-12 (1993).  In the ACLU, Live and Let 
Live poll in 1994, 75% of respondents were concerned a “great deal” or a “fair amount” that 
health insurance companies are putting medical information about them into a computer 
information bank that others have access to.  Medical Privacy Public Opinion Polls,  
http://www.epic.org/privacy/medical/polls.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).  I do not propose that 
we devise policy based solely upon polling data.  These polls do not measure trade-offs between 
privacy and other consumer preferences.  They do not capture the choices that consumers make in 
the real world.  They usually do not explore the available solutions to the problems that they 
identify, nor do they specify the legal and economic consequences of those solutions.  Robert 
Weissberg, Why Policymakers Should Ignore Public Opinion Polls, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS, 
May 29, 2001, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa402.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).  
Despite these shortcomings, the polls do reveal a broadly shared concern about practices that 
threaten privacy. 
 3. Others phrase the ebb and flow in grander historic terms.  The late nineteenth century, 
with the invention of the portable camera and the proliferation of sensational (so-called “yellow”) 
journalism, is identified as one crest that spurred Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis to write 
their famous law review article, The Right to Privacy, which supported the right, as Judge 
Thomas Cooley articulated it, “to be left alone.”  Richard M. Gellman, Can Privacy be Regulated 
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to express the concern for privacy.  We perceive that our privacy is 
endangered, but we are not sure what to do about it.  Some abuses focus our 
attention and grounds demands for specific redress, such as periodic efforts to 
regulate telemarketers.  However, these responses are haphazard and 
disjointed.  Part of the explanation likely lies in a disconnect among our 
preferences; we claim that we oppose intrusions upon our privacy even as we 
readily provide valuable personal information such as Social Security Numbers 
to telemarketers who ask for them.4  Perhaps we do not recognize the 
relationship between filing applications for “free” Caribbean holidays and store 
discount cards and the subsequent onslaught of spam emails, telephone 
solicitations, junk surface mail, and sometimes, identity theft.  More likely, we 
want the benefits that are apparently offered and underestimate the costs that 
are entailed.  There is abundant evidence of people holding contradictory 
preferences.  For example, environmentalists sometimes drive gas-guzzling 
automobiles, peace activists sometimes resort to violence, and some who are 
devoutly religious limit their nominally universal vocation to fellow believers.  
Similarly, we may have inconsistent views about privacy: we may want its 
protections while we may also want the benefits that flow from practices that 
undermine those protections. 
Another part of the explanation for this disconnect between expressed 
preferences and apparently contradictory practices is the expansive sweep of 
the concept of privacy.  This concept is cited in many contexts to support 
varied policies and practices.  We may perceive privacy violations in only 
some of these policies and practices and our sensitivities may vary sharply 
across the policies and practices.  The preservation of intimacy in our relations 
with others is a privacy interest.  The accumulation and dissemination of 
medical information (including genetic) impinges upon our privacy interests.  
Access to our financial records affects our privacy interests.  The generation of 
a digital persona, created from data that is acquired, merged, and shared 
through connecting computer networks, whether with or without our 
complicity, evinces privacy concerns.  The protection of our homes against 
 
Effectively on a National Level? Thoughts on the Possible Need for International Privacy Rules, 
41 VILL. L. REV. 129, 132-33 (1996).  The computer revolution that rapidly accelerated in the 
1960s stirred up another storm, resulting in various statutes addressing the informational privacy 
that was threatened by the unprecedented advances in information technologies.  Id. at 133.  
According to the authors, the third wave is upon us, overdetermined by further IT developments 
combined with the enhanced security measures devised and implemented to confront the threat of 
international and domestic terrorism.  Douglas J. Sylvester & Sharon Lohr, Counting on 
Confidentiality: Legal and Statistical Approaches to Federal Privacy Law After the USA Patriot 
Act, 2005 WISE. L. REV. 1033, 1033, 1036-38 (2005); Note, Up in Smoke: Online Privacy 
Becomes the Latest Casualty in the War on Drugs, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 169, 185 (2003). 
 4. See generally KEVIN D. MITNICK & WILLIAM L. SIMON, THE ART OF DECEPTION 
(2002). 
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physical intrusion and against physically non-intrusive surveillance invokes 
our privacy interests.  So too does the use of surveillance technology to 
monitor our whereabouts in public places—either videotaping us or relying 
upon transmitters to track our location.  The right to choose to have an abortion 
has been upheld as a privacy right.5  We likely have differing intuitions about 
the level of privacy protection that is appropriate for these and other privacy 
situations. 
Moreover, there does not seem to be a simple conception of privacy that 
wholly underwrites these privacy policies and practices.  There is likely a 
“family resemblance” among the privacy interests, a la Wittgenstein’s 
description of the relationship among games,6 but thus far, there is no 
consensus about a single definition that captures all of privacy’s ambit.  Is it 
control of information,7 control of access to our person,8 control over who can 
sense us,9 control over the intimacies of personal identity,10 the protection of 
human dignity,11 the development of personal autonomy (whether as an end in 
itself12 or as promoting civil society13), or some other definition that is at the 
core of privacy concerns?  This failure of a single, comprehensive definition is 
hardly fatal and certainly not unique.  Many familiar terms are similarly 
inexact (indeed, they are often elastic) and nonetheless useful.14  We are 
dealing with an inexact term that will connote different meanings in different 
contexts. 
Yet another aspect of our current ambiguities about privacy is the lack of 
historical precedent for many current challenges to privacy.  The founders did 
not have deeply held convictions about the threats to privacy that alarm us 
because the technologies that ground those threats were in their infancy.  Their 
society was considerably simpler, in part, because it was not thoroughly 
permeated by applied technologies.  A right to privacy was not elaborately 
articulated because privacy could be taken for granted.  The sanctity of the 
home and the security of personal papers and mailed correspondence were 
 
 5. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“The right to privacy. . . as we feel it is . . . 
is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”). 
 6. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1088, 1097 (2002). 
 7. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968). 
 8. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980). 
 9. Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 276 (1974). 
 10. JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION (1992); Tom Gerety, Redefining 
Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 236 (1977). 
 11. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser, N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1002 (1964). 
 12. C. Keith Boone, Privacy and Community, 9 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 1 (1983). 
 13. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, STAN. 
L. REV. 1373, 1426-28 (2000). 
 14. Paul F. Campos, Reflections on the Intersection of Law and Linguistics, WASH. U. L.Q. 
971, 978 (1995). 
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salient concerns, but the founders’ physicians and their medical records were 
not tied to computer networks.  Government and private enterprises did not 
collect information about them on multiple accounts, nor was that information 
easily accessible and collative.  The founders were not available via telephone 
or email to uninvited solicitors.  A description of the differences between the 
mores and practices of an 18th century decentralized, rural society and our 
increasingly urban, centralized, and technology dependent society is worth 
more attention than can be paid here.  The point is that our constitutional 
heritage does not directly address the privacy permutations that confront 
contemporary society.15  The variable issues of privacy protection that now 
concern us have emerged from our unprecedented technologies.  We cannot 
expect to find specific guidance about how to resolve these difficulties in the 
wisdom of writers who could not have imagined that our lives would 
intertwine with technologies that both cushion and smother us. 
Anita Allen has provided a useful typology in which privacy interests are 
categorized according to their informational, physical, proprietary, and 
decisional meanings.16  These are helpful categories, but they are conventional 
rather than essential.  They might be misleading to the extent that they suggest 
that the boundaries of the meanings are crisp and obvious or that they provide 
doctrinal guidance with which to sanction or disallow particular privacy 
claims.  In contrast, hacker access to our personal computer files can involve 
all four meanings.  The physical invasion is slight, but nonetheless noticeable, 
as even the slightest physical intrusion can have an impact disproportionate to 
its material footprint.  The compromise of proprietary information may be 
significant if the data accessed without permission has commercial value.  The 
impact upon decisional liberty may be implicated if the files obtained include 
research and writing that concerns personal decision-making.  These 
interpretations are not strained because we increasingly rely upon our 
computers for all-purpose business and personal processing, as well as storage 
support.  Likewise, we may suspect that our privacy interests are implicated in 
situations that do not neatly fall within one of these meanings.  For example, a 
person might judge the extent to which privacy is threatened by the willingness 
of others to surrender their own privacy, as the norm of what one can 
reasonably expect to be protected is thereby diminished.17  This is a broader 
 
 15. A strict constructionist view of the Constitution would limit its protection for privacy to 
the enumerated instances, e.g., there can be no quartering of soldiers in private homes.  Other 
privacy abuses not mentioned, the Ninth Amendment notwithstanding, are then left for legislative 
action.  Carl T. Rowan, Equality as a Constitutional Concept, 47 MD. L. REV. 10, 12 (1987). 
 16. RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
25 (1999). 
 17. The Katz standard makes this acutely relevant.  Courts are directed to protect actual 
(subjective) expectations “that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”  Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  If the expectation is not present, then 
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concern than covered by any of the four specific meanings, but it clearly 
should qualify as a legitimate privacy claim.18 
The United States has been reluctant to offer programmatic and systematic 
protections to privacy, either by legislation, by judicial interpretation, or by 
executive order.19  Most European countries have attempted a systematic, 
omnibus approach with a comprehensive set of national privacy laws (and 
enforcement mechanisms such as an office of data protection).20  Their 
approach arises from a different consensus about the role of government 
regulation of private enterprise.21  Europe regards privacy as a personal right 
that is nonproprietary in nature and shifts the burden of persuasion to those 
whose practices affect privacy interests.22  In Europe, privacy is a right; in 
America, it is an economic commodity.23 The United States prefers a laissez 
faire view of the government’s relations with private enterprise.24  The United 
States does not presume that new practices violate privacy interests and 
responds to individual problems only as they broach relevant thresholds of 
public alarm.25  One can phrase this response as pragmatic, a case-by-case 
approach that respects the nuances of particular settings and parties.  More 
sharply, one can criticize the reponse as an ad hoc, hodge-podge reaction in 
which sensationalized abuses are the focus of piecemeal legal intervention 
even as a quiet accretion of incremental changes undermine important privacy 
interests, sometimes with government endorsement.  “Oversight . . . is 
decentralized.  [Privacy] protection is not a core mission of any government 
agency.”26  There is no overarching view of a systemic problem because 
privacy problems are regarded as discrete and isolated epiphenomena.27 
 
the reasonableness prong is likely moot.  United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 
1990). 
 18. This concern for reduced expectations of privacy leads to Anita Allen’s suggestion that 
perhaps we should “force privacy” on people.  Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 723, 732-34 (1999). 
 19. Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private 
Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 500 (1995). 
 20. PRIVACIES: PHILOSOPHICAL EVALUATIONS 28 (2004). 
 21. Julia M. Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 461, 470 (2000). 
 22. GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 
395 (1997). 
 23. Eric Dash, Europe Zips Lips; U.S. Sells Zips, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2005, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/07/weekinreview/07dash.html?ex=1128830400&en=d6c0d50b
ab23d734&ei=507 (last visited Oct. 16, 2005). 
 24. Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 62 
(1999). 
 25. Gellman, supra note 3, at 130, 134. 
 26. Dash, supra note 23. 
 27. Fromholz, supra note 21, at 471-72. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
38 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:33 
I have already averred to the difficulty of identifying a single 
comprehensive definition of privacy with which to engage the varying 
practices that can be phrased as threats to privacy.  I do not propose to proffer 
yet another definition.  However, I do propose to follow the example of Alan 
Westin and suggest that we should look to the functions that privacy performs 
as the best way to understand privacy and how we should devise means to 
protect it from encroachments. 28  I shall first describe some of the challenges 
that face privacy in our technology rich society.  I will employ the four 
categories articulated by Westin to order that presentation.  Westin described 
“basic states of individual privacy”29 and, while I am not wedded to his 
definition of these states, they nonetheless offer a useful means to parse the 
various challenges to privacy that I will describe. 
Westin’s four basic states are: solitude, intimacy, anonymity, and 
reserve.30  With solitude, “the individual is separated from the group and freed 
from the observation of other persons.”31  Westin acknowledged that various 
other stimuli might affect the person in solitude.32  This stimuli ranges from 
physical stimuli, such as noise and odors, to psychological intrusions, like the 
presence of God or one’s conscience.33  Still, there is separation from others in 
solitude that serves as a model of isolation.34  With intimacy, the person is a 
member of “a small unit that claims and is allowed to exercise corporate 
seclusion so that it may achieve a close, relaxed, and frank relationship.”35  
The traditional husband–wife relationship is a clear instance, but work cliques 
also qualify.36  With anonymity, “the individual is in public places or 
performing public acts but still seeks, and finds, freedom from identification 
and surveillance.”37  The individual “does not expect to be personally 
identified and held to the full rules of behavior and roles that would operate if 
he were known,” as the individual has merged into the “situational 
landscape.”38  Lastly, reserve is “the creation of a psychological barrier against 
unwanted intrusion.”39  This is what George Simmel called “reciprocal reserve 
and indifference,”40 a mental distance that protects personality and “is the 
 
 28. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31 (1967). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. WESTIN, supra note 28. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 32. 
 40. WESTIN, supra note 28, at 32.  Per Simmel, the intensification of nervous stimulation 
was the gravest problem for the modern person.  THE FIN DE SIECLE 62 (2000).  The modern 
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dynamic aspect of privacy in daily interpersonal relations.”41  Reserve is the 
most elusive of the four states, however, despite the difficulty of specifying a 
definition, it is an important part of our functional expectations for privacy. 
A. Anonymity 
This is a curious category of concern because its ubiquity is tied to modern 
urbanization.  In a rural setting, it is difficult to be anonymous, at least in one’s 
own community, because everyone knows each other.  Even in small towns, 
though the degree of familiarity is less, most people are recognizable to each 
other, while those who are not recognized stick out as different.  The cities at 
the time of our nation’s founding were large in comparison with the towns and 
villages from which they evolved, however they did not approximate the 
numbers that cities now total.42  Furthermore, one was known within a sector 
of the city.  Cities by their size and function promote anonymity, but the 
repetition of encounters within a neighborhood personalized the exchanges.43  
Movement within these cities was not facilitated by mass transportation and 
travel from one’s neighborhood to another was often regarded as risky 
business.44  In effect, technological limitations forced people to interact with 
each other.45  In addition, though migrants founded the country and periodic 
migrations (recurrently west) mark its history, the stability of communities 
persisted through these migrations.46  Even though many people merely passed 
through places, more people stayed.47  The terms might be measured in years 
or decades rather than generations, but these early urban neighborhoods 
retained the characteristics and functions associated with small rural 
communities.  Thus, one would not be truly anonymous in a city of 
neighborhoods, or at least the anonymity would be limited in scope. 
Modernity changed the conditions of urban life.  Technology enables us to 
shake loose of a dependence upon a local support system.48  The massive, 
mobile, and independent populations of large cities make anonymity 
unavoidable.  One cannot take the time to make the acquaintance of everyone 
 
struggles to preserve a subjective life against the overwhelming power of metropolitan forces.  Id. 
at 61. 
 41. WESTIN, supra note 28, at 32. 
 42. A POPULATION HISTORY OF NORTH AMERICA 1 (2000). 
 43. Jessica Bulman, Publishing Privacy: Intellectual Property, Self-Expression, and the 
Victorian Novel, 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 73, 78 (2003). 
 44. HENRY WILLIAM ELSON, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 290-92 (1905). 
 45. Bulman, supra note 43, at 78-79. 
 46. ROGER DANIELS, COMING TO AMERICA: A HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND ETHNICITY 
IN AMERICAN LIFE 125 (2002). 
 47. Id. 
 48. B.J. FOGG, PERSUASIVE TECHNOLOGY: USING COMPUTERS TO CHANGE WHAT WE 
THINK AND DO 8 (2003). 
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that they encounter.  Indeed, one cannot make eye contact with the 
uncountable many that one faces each day, as exhaustion would result from too 
many salutes, nods, and greetings.  Instead, one melts into the flow of bustling 
humanity individually purposeful, observing norms of efficiency and 
politeness, but otherwise disinterested.  We suspend the demands of social 
interaction that would otherwise slow and confuse us. 
Although there are limits to this sanctioned lack of regard for each other, 
within them we are allowed to act as though we are invisible.49  We are located 
in public space and can call attention to ourselves by violating the governing 
norms of conduct—like, for example, if we sing a popular tune too loudly or 
bustle too aggressively.  Nevertheless, the norms allow a tremendous degree of 
unencumbered actions without accountability.  Surely, we surrender something 
that is important by distancing from others and we would not want this 
distancing to define our social lives.  On the other hand, if we must submit to 
the pace and indifference of a massively populous circumstance, we should be 
allowed the benefits of its apparently boundless scale and blissful 
obliviousness. 
This increasing anonymity in urban places coincides with the rise of 
individualism, both as creed and practice.50  Anonymity serves to reinforce 
norms that promote individualism.51  For example, you can read more daringly 
if you can acquire reading material anonymously.52  The strictures of a small, 
parochial place might dissuade its denizens against exploratory reading, 
especially if the unfamiliar reading material were regarded as risqué or 
threatening.  Associations, too, are more freely developed in the anonymity of 
a large place.53  One can test the attractions of new ideas and different people 
more readily where one need not justify the dalliance to family and 
acquaintances.  This license to explore anonymously is not without 
shortcomings, as not only positive self-expression is empowered.  
Pornography, for example, is consumed in greater quantities when it can be 
 
 49. The contrast of orientation between personal relations in a rural setting and impersonal 
relations in an urban setting has been cited as a ground for the difference between shame and guilt 
as a basis for morality.  See generally BERNARD WILLIAMS, SHAME AND NECESSITY (1993). 
 50. Ann M. Lucas, Race, Class, Gender, and Deviancy: The Criminalization of Prostitution, 
10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 47, 52 (1995). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Ready access to a patron’s borrowing record at a library threatens that patron’s 
independence.  The PATRIOT Act includes a provision granting access to a patron’s records and 
that provision is strongly resisted and resented by professional library associations.  Kathryn 
Martin, The USA Patriot Act’s Application to Library Patron Records, 29 J. LEGIS 283, 290 
(2003).  It is noteworthy that the publication of a record of the videotapes rented by a prominent 
judicial nominee led to federal legislation protecting video rental records.  Jonathan Zittrain, What 
the Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual Property and Privacy in an Era of Trusted 
Privication, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1234 (2000). 
 53. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS 3 (1999). 
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accessed anonymously, as witnessed by the proliferation of pornography on the 
Internet.54  Anonymity enables a kind of schizophrenia in which the life that 
one displays to the public may be wholly unlike the life that one lives 
undetected by others.55  The contrasting uses of anonymity are yet another 
instance of the burden of personal freedom.  The fact that we are free to choose 
for ourselves does not assure that we will choose wisely or well.  We are trying 
both to assure personal freedom and to promote its responsible exercise, but we 
cannot assure the latter without compromising the former. 
Technological advances are redefining the terms of urban anonymity.56  
Camera surveillance is a primary vector for this redefinition.57  The 
proposition to video-monitor public streets was initially concentrated on low-
end criminal activity.58  If police officers could not be present at all times on 
streets where drug distribution or prostitution were rampant, camera 
surveillance could serve as substitutes, taping the illegal activities and 
empowering later arrests and prosecutions.59  Equipment costs have declined 
and surveillance is budgeted for implementation in an increasing number of 
locations.60  Public alarm about the threat of terrorism has fueled the expanded 
use of surveillance technologies, especially in the aftermath of the airline 
suicide attacks of September 11, 2001, and the 2005 subway bombing episodes 
in London (with the video tapes of the perpetrators).61  Public transportation 
depots are being outfitted with elaborate camera systems to support both active 
surveillance and ex post facto analysis of taped events.62  It is unlikely that 
surveillance systems, once installed, will be dismantled. 
 
 54. PAMELA PAUL, PORNIFIED: HOW PORNOGRAPHY IS TRANSFORMING OUR LIVES, OUR 
RELATIONSHIPS, AND OUR FAMILIES 49 (2005). 
 55. This control of information to deceive others defines the core use of privacy.  Richard A. 
Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978).  He regards privacy protection as the 
means by which one hides information from others in order to manipulate or otherwise take 
advantage of them.  “Very few people want to be let alone.  They want to manipulate the world 
around them by selective disclosure of facts about themselves . . . .”  Id. at 400-01. 
 56. TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 10-12 (1997). 
 57. Electronic Privacy Information Center, Spotlight on Surveillance: More Cities Deploy 
Camera Surveillance Systems with Federal Grant Money, available at www.epic.org/privacy/ 
surveillance/spotlight/0505.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).  
 58. REG WHITAKER, THE END OF PRIVACY 81 (1999). 
 59. See DAVID D. BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO 
CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 5 (1998). 
 60. Martha T. Moore, Cities Opening More Video Surveillance Eyes, USA TODAY, July 18, 
2005, available at http://usatoday.printthis.clickability.com (last visited Feb. 14, 2006). 
 61. Alice Lipowicz, London Bombings Sound Security Alarm, WASH. TECH, 
www.washingtontechnology.com/news/20_14/cover-stories/26592-1.html (last visited Feb. 16, 
2006). 
 62. Lindsay Isaacs, Transit Surveillance: Wrecks, Lies, and Videotape, AM. CITY & 
COUNTY, Jan. 1, 2003, at 20. 
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Shopping malls have replaced stores fronting on public streets as the 
standard setting for retail shopping, largely because private ownership of the 
property surrounding shops provides the owners with considerably greater 
control over invitees who enter the property.63  First Amendment rights are not 
protected on private property to the same extent as in public places.64  In 
addition, many actions, such as unsanctioned solicitations and loitering, are 
more easily controlled on private property.65  Control is the key consideration, 
and surveillance cameras are a logical extension of the control that mall 
owners already exercise.  Many private security officers are charged to patrol 
shopping malls and can monitor a higher number of places more efficiently 
with a network of surveillance cameras.66  For this reason, in a shopping mall 
one should presume that cameras are watching, as there is no longer anonymity 
in that quasi-public space. 
The task is monitoring shopper activities.  Surveillance of shopper 
movements with cameras is one approach, but there are other monitoring 
options.  We shall not soon reach the extremes of the movie Minority Report, 
in which scanners recognized an identity imprint on each person’s eyes and 
entreated that person by name to buy goods in the shops they were passing.67  
The scanners likely knew each person’s purchasing history and framed their 
entreaties accordingly.  Instead, Radio Frequency Identifications (“RFIDs”) 
placed on merchandise will enable scanners to read the tags from a few feet 
away.68  RFIDs are an important commercial development because they will 
help deter shoplifting and will facilitate inventory control.69  If the tag is 
removed when a sale occurs, then there is no further communication between 
the tag and the readers.70  If the tag is disabled rather than removed, other 
readers can still read the tag (and track the movement of the merchandise to 
which it is attached) if the disabling is reversible.71  Indeed, consumers may be 
attracted to reactivated tags to catalogue their belongings and to assist in 
recovery if they are stolen. 
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 66. See id. at 588-90. 
 67. See MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox 2002). 
 68. Gal Eschet, FIPs And PETs For RFID: Protecting Privacy In the Web of Radio 
Frequency Identification, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 301, 302 (2005). 
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RFID sensing technology was initially developed for aircraft in World War 
II to identify and distinguish friend from foe.72  It was later employed with 
other military equipment and then with cattle and railroad cars.73  Today, a tire 
company embeds tags in its tires.74  Technological improvements and 
economies of scale are projected to reduce costs per application from dimes 
and quarters to pennies and make RFIDs a viable technology for retail 
merchandise.75  Rather than being attached after manufacture, RFIDs will be 
integrated into merchandise during the manufacturing process.76  The tags will 
be a less obtrusive, permanent part of the product.77  It may even become 
impossible to determine if a product contains an RFID.  The tags provide the 
means to track the merchandise (and anyone wearing the merchandise) via a 
network of readers.78  Prisons, hospitals, and elementary schools have 
legitimate reasons to monitor their wards, and tagged clothing would assist that 
tracking.  Similarly, other industries might be concerned with tracking the 
whereabouts of the employees or guests of their facilities at all times.  
Otherwise, we may be alarmed by a technology that compiles a record—an 
electronic trail—in remarkable detail of our everyday activities, limited only 
by the placement of online readers. 
RFIDs can be active, but are less expensive when passive.79  When active, 
RFIDs have an on-tag power source and an active transmitter.80  When 
passive, they are without either a power source or a transmitter.81  Passive 
RFIDs do not emit a signal, but present themselves to be read by scanners.82  
The advantage they provide to merchandisers and to the monitoring of 
prisoners, minors, and patients will hasten their widespread adoption.83  RFIDs 
will be present in an increasingly large amount of the clothing that we wear 
and will provide the means to generate a chronology of the daily location of 
anyone conventionally clothed.84  Profligate use will undermine informational 
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self-determination, which will affect our autonomy and anonymity.85  Credit 
card records already provide a kind of biography of each cardholder, limited in 
scope to those aspects of the person that are captured by expenditures.  RFIDs 
will provide a more ambitious biography, chronicling our daily activities.86  
Because we must affirmatively manage our acquisition of tagged goods to 
avoid its coverage, it will rob us of default anonymity in location and 
movement. 
The widespread use and acceptance of RFIDs is anticipated by the 
proliferation of Global Position System (“GPS”) devices in automobiles and 
cell phones.87  In both cases, the initial motivation to make GPS devices 
standard equipment was safety enhancement.88  In many emergency situations, 
people in distress had the means to call for help, but were unable to provide 
information about their location.89  Similarly, trucks laden with goods can be 
tracked with GPS technology so that their locations can always be identified.90  
The transportation of goods can be managed more efficiently when their 
locations can be easily determined.  The technology has two effects: it permits 
the GPS user to determine their own location and allows others to determine 
the location of the GPS user.91  The on-going monitoring of location permits 
the monitoring of speed.92  One car rental agency attempted to charge penalty 
fees to its customers for each instance that the vehicle exceeded the posted 
speed limit.93  Regardless of the initial motivation, GPS technology provides a 
reliable and accurate means to track and record the location of transmitters 
assigned to a cell phone or an automobile.  The automobile is ubiquitous in 
American life and the cell phone is insinuating itself rapidly, especially among 
today’s youth.  In each case, we are making ourselves traceable by anyone who 
gains access to the GPS.  These technological conveniences may betray us by 
making our past and current locations an open record. 
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RFIDs and GPS are high-technology tracking systems.  Comparatively 
simpler tracking systems already compile records of credit card use, website 
visits, grocery and prescription purchases, driving license data, and scores of 
other important information about us.94  Computer systems used to be opaque 
and discrete, as data collected by one system was unavailable to another.95  
The practical effects of Moore’s Law96 are a tremendous growth in capacity 
and a dramatic reduction in storage costs.97  Connectivity problems between 
databanks have proven largely surmountable, and, coupled with programming 
innovations, data collection and manipulation are inexpensive and pervasive.98 
These advances have enabled companies like ChoicePoint, Acxiom, and 
LexisNexis to connect multiple databanks and create intricate dossiers of 
information about almost anyone.99  Originally, the motivation for the 
companies was the profits available for the commercial applications of collated 
and cross-referenced data.100  These companies could sell lists of ingeniously 
collated information to buyers who might, for example, have a reason to 
selectively market to individuals who recently registered a late model luxury 
automobile and spend in excess of $1,500.00 each year on air transportation.101  
These uses are alarming, but after September 11, 2001, ambitions for the use of 
information greatly expanded.102  The federal government had separated the 
data systems of its various agencies and programs from each other as a matter 
of law and policy.103  There were legitimate concerns about the centralization 
of power in government hands and that concern encompassed the power of 
information.104  Post 9/11, our priorities shifted.  The largest data warehouse 
companies offered to share their information databases with the federal 
government.105  The motives were both patriotic (to assist in the location of 
terrorists and bolster the country’s defenses) and economic.106  Although 
programs like Total Information Awareness (“TIA”) Program suggest that the 
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federal government wants to compile information databases itself,107 if the 
government is unable to do so, they can instead contract with private industry 
for the information services that it needs.108  The coordination of data derived 
from the simplest exchange in the smallest system is now subsumed in the 
maw of the data warehouse giants and, through them, the federal 
government.109 
B. Personal Intimacy 
Medical records provide an appropriate segue from anonymity to personal 
intimacy.  The medical profession promotes an ideal physician–patient 
relationship in which the patient unhesitatingly confides in the physician.110  
The physician–patient privilege is built upon this model, which “enables a 
patient to secure medical attention without fear of betrayal and unwarranted 
embarrassing and detrimental disclosure in court of information which might 
deter him from revealing his symptoms to a doctor to the detriment of his 
health.”111  However, the model is built upon a notional relationship that has 
proven problematic.112  In practice, the relationship may not have been as 
fiduciary as it was described in theory, and it may have been objectionably 
paternalistic.113  With changes in the marketing of medical services, many 
patients now insist upon an active role in their diagnosis and treatment.114  The 
idealization and evolution of the relationship is a complex subject beyond the 
reach of this paper.  What is relevant is a two-step attack on the privacy that 
grounds that relationship.  The first step is concerned with advances in 
genomics that enable personalized medicine.  The second step is concerned 
with managed health care and computerized medical records.  Both directly 
undermine the intimacy of the patient-physician relationship and diminish 
expectations of anonymity. 
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Though humans are genetically identical to a remarkable extent 
(99.9%),115 given that the human genome contains approximately 3 billion 
base pairs of DNA, there are some three million genetic differences between 
almost any two individuals.116  Thus, we are as crucially different as we are 
incredibly alike.117  The differences underwrite toxicogenomics, the study of 
gene expression in response to toxic exposure,118 and toxicogenetics, the study 
of genetic variations that affect susceptibility to toxins.119  Given the pace of 
current studies, soon we shall be able to predict which particular individuals 
are more likely than the general population to contract illnesses (or otherwise 
compromise their health) on account of their particular polymorphisms, genetic 
variations, and known, identifiable conditions in specific environments.120 
Given an ability to identify susceptible individuals (at least for some 
illnesses), we can anticipate that concerned parties, such as employers, will 
adopt screening procedures to preempt the exposure of susceptible individuals 
to the triggering toxin.121  The screening procedures may be adopted as a 
condition for employment.122  If an applicant tests positive for the relevant 
polymorphisms, he or she will be ineligible for employment.123  The ground 
for the ineligibility is the identified health risk.124  The employer is making a 
judgment on behalf of the applicant about his or her susceptibility to the health 
risk and also making a judgment about their own potential tort liability to 
compensate that person if, or when, the illness arises.125  In response, a 
comparable temptation to intervene on behalf of employees will likely arise 
among legislators and regulators. 
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This is an example of how knowledge of the human genome is going to 
affect health care before the onset of symptoms.  Knowledge of an individual’s 
genome will permit the personalization of medical care.126  Rather than 
adopting treatment plans according to their probability of success in the 
general population, physicians will devise treatment plans that respond to the 
particular genome of each patient.127  The identification of these “susceptibility 
genes” can encourage a reductionist-view of human capacity.  Despite the 
caution that most susceptibility genes are probabilistic and express themselves 
differently according to varying environmental conditions, the qualifications 
can get lost in the translation to popular understanding and commercial 
application.128  Susceptibility may be mistakenly viewed as certainty and 
market forces may drive employers and insurers to discriminate based on 
genetic constitution.129  Although there is legislation prohibiting this 
discrimination,130 such legislation will likely prove futile as genetic testing 
becomes a regular part of medical care and gene test reports become a routine 
feature of medical folders.131  As physicians inform their decisions about 
treatment options with the relationships between medication efficacy and 
genetic polymorphisms, genetic profiles will be decipherable from the 
treatments pursued in individual cases.  Even without a genetic record, a 
knowledgeable reviewer will be able to extrapolate some genetic 
polymorphisms from a treatment record. 
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The increasing sophistication of insured citizens, as well as the ease of 
access to and reduced costs of genetic testing will precipitate changes in 
current laws and regulations limiting employer/insurer access to, and use of, 
genetic tests.  As individuals with susceptibility genes marking the certainty of 
a later disease test themselves and over-insure against the later disease, 
insurance companies will petition for the authority to test for those diseases to 
protect their basic commercial premise—dividing costs of coverage among 
claimants with comparable probabilities of risk.  Without that change, insurers 
will be victimized by adverse selection, as those seeking insurance will know 
more about the probability of future disease than the insurers and will over-
insure, while those who do not anticipate gene-related illness will under-insure. 
Within these strategies, there is a tendancy to bleed away the contingencies 
of each person’s life choices and instead focus on a genetic profile.  The tilt 
toward genetic reductionism will erode patient confidence in their physicians, 
who will be expected to order genetic testing because it will be indicated by 
the governing standard of care.  Genetic test results will be available to 
whomever the physician is obligated to provide them, which means that health 
insurance companies will able to acquire and trade the reports.132  Insurance 
companies will have legitimate grounds to acquire and analyze the reports and 
they will not be able to resist the temptation to expand their use to purposes 
that do not benefit the patient.  The use of medical/genetic records will 
undermine the confidential relationship that is critically important for accurate 
and effective health care.  If physicians are the point of contact for a network 
that gathers genetic information about the patient and imposes burdens or 
otherwise disadvantages the patient, the patient will regard the physician as 
primarily loyal to the network and its priorities. 
In addition, patients will not be able to maintain control of their genomes.  
Rather, the data will be accessible to whoever is authorized to access it.  The 
authorization protocols will likely be managed by the health insurance 
company rather than the patient.133  A condition of coverage will likely be the 
grant of permission to the insurance company to access and use the data.  
Gradual “mission creep” will lead to use of the data for scientific research, 
perhaps broadly construed, and other purposes not directly benefiting the 
patient such as cost containment.  Laws and regulations will aim to preserve a 
degree of anonymity for the patient’s records, but the control valve, however 
constrained, will be held by insurers.  Anonymity will be protected, or not, as it 
comports with the priorities of the insurer.  Even if the insurer adopts policies 
and practices to protect patient anonymity, it is difficult to assure that the data 
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will not be accessed illegally.  It is also difficult to assure that those who 
manage the data system will possess the attitude and commitment that the 
insurer presumes will guide their performance.  Public choice theory suggests 
that they will not.134  Effective anonymity then depends upon managing a 
chain of employees acting to further their own private or vested interests. 
Health care is managed by corporations focused on economies of scale and 
wide-ranging standardized procedures.135  Care is individualized to the degree 
that each patient’s unique characteristics permit a more accurate diagnosis.136  
Each patient is also reduced to the sum of those characteristics and the treating 
physician is answerable to the relevant health insurer for care that deviates 
from the prescribed standard.137  There is a deep irony in this juxtaposition of 
improved diagnostics enabled by genetic research and a diminished confidence 
in the physicians informed by these improvements because their patients have 
been reduced to the sum of their biomarkers.  It may be that treatment 
improves at the cost of reduced confidence in the treatment providers. 
The cost pressures of health care have already undermined patient 
confidence in treatment aside from genetic developments.138  The model of a 
physician with a personal relationship with each of her patients may have 
always been unachievable in practice, but it served aspirational purposes.139  
The adoption of managed health care practices has largely subverted that 
aspiration.140  Most patients have severely limited contact with the doctors who 
treat them.141  The health care industry relies heavily upon underpaid and 
under-trained staff and overtaxed nurses to contain costs.142  There are too few 
opportunities for patients to connect with their caregivers as fellow human 
beings, open to each other’s unique qualities and experiences.143  
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Considerations of efficiency often promote an indifference to the basic 
requirements of care-giving that nurture interpersonal bonding.144  There is 
already a reduced amount of patient confidence available to confront the new 
challenges to genetic knowledge.145 
Although the focus is primarily upon technology-based threats to privacy, 
it is useful to briefly acknowledge other threats to intimacy that arise from 
lifestyle choices.  These choices affect many of the relationships traditionally 
regarded as intimate.  As we reconfigure those relationships and squeeze 
intimacy out of them, we diminish their privacy content and impact.  The 
mobility of the modern nuclear family stretches the support of extended family 
that fosters intimate relations.146  There are sound evolutionary reasons for 
expanding a circle of concern to include more than the immediate family.  A 
larger circle of kin relations provides more opportunities for intimate 
connection and protects against breaks in core family relationships.147  The 
extended network provides reinforcement and resiliency.148  With a peripatetic 
life, one is thrown back on the core family with each change of location.  
Efforts to supplant kin relations with networks of friends can strain under the 
pressure of short durations and frequent turnover.  Households with two 
working spouses or only one parent are routine, and it can be difficult for these 
parents to devote adequate time and energy to their children.  These stresses 
are better reported elsewhere, but nonetheless contribute to the general 
diminishment of intimacy within families. 
The influence of the mass media (television, the music and motion picture 
industries, videogames, iPods and other pocket sized ultra light audio players, 
the Internet, etc.) is relevant, in part, because their combined impact is not 
outweighed by contrasting values inculcated during extensive familial 
activities.149  There may not be enough family events to constitute an effective 
counterweight.150  School is expected to provide skills and attitudes that were 
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once the province of the family.151  Increased reliance upon organized sports 
and other organized activities deserves mention as well.  They provide 
alternative sources of norms and intimacy, which, on balance, contribute to a 
child’s development, but they may also supplant the core intimacy of the 
family.152  The result of the reduction in the amount and quality of time shared 
with family members is that many children are influenced less by their parents 
than by the mass media and by their school and extracurricular experiences.153 
Another consideration bears mention.  A criticism of past privacy practices 
is that abuses within the family were shielded from detection by conventions 
that forbade or hindered outside interference as violating the sanctity of the 
family.154  This is the crux of the feminist complaint, which points out that 
much of the subjugation of women occurred in households and that the 
political impact of the subjugation was ignored by tunnel vision apologies for 
family insularity.155  The family should not be a free-fire zone for sexual, 
physical, or psychological abuse, and victims should be encouraged to 
recognize and report the abuse.  We want to empower victims to see beyond 
the confines of their particular family’s practices.156  On the other hand, we do 
not want family members to presume that their family is objectionably 
dysfunctional.  Efforts to identify abuse and intervene can be overly zealous 
and interfere with families whose practices are not abusive, but instead are 
different.  Some abuse is readily identifiable, but other purported abuse may 
not be easily ascertained.  Is corporal punishment always abuse?  Is martinet 
parenting necessarily abusive?  It is less important to answer these and related 
questions (such as those concerning the political implications of the allocation 
of authority within the family) than to recognize that their resolution affects the 
independence and stability of the nuclear family.157  The imposition of 
conventional expectations may undermine trust and intimacy in families that 
are merely unconventional.  We want to protect norms that stretch beyond the 
conventional.  We should be cautious about uncritically endorsing motives to 
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peer within the family in search of aberrations.  If we want families to serve as 
asylums and incubators in which children become adults under the guidance 
and care of their parents, we should preserve norms of non-intervention. 
Finally, it is worth noting that Americans do not enlist in community 
organizations, which can function as family amplifiers and surrogates, as they 
historically did.158  DeToqueville remarked about his journeys among us in the 
early 19th century that we were consummate joiners, that civil society 
flourished among the several states he visited because Americans flocked to 
civic, religious, and other organizations that both provided useful services to 
the community and reinforced shared values and social bonds among their 
members.159  As has been noted, Americans now “bowl alone.”160  We do not 
join leagues with others but instead pursue our individual interests by 
ourselves.161  The widely shared penchant for computer games and other 
individualized interactions with computer technologies exacerbate the 
problem.162  This preference for solo activities is not reducible to increased 
individualism with each person pursuing a uniquely differentiated life.163  
Indeed, we are often doing the same things as our neighbors.164  Our “social 
capital” has plummeted because we now do by ourselves what we used to do 
together.165  The theme deserves more attention than is appropriate here, but it 
is another instance of a contraction of intimacy, in this case a reduced number 
of people with whom one shares experiences and thereby reveals oneself to 
another and receives the revelations of another. 
C. Solitude 
If we are not comforted by regular contact with our extended family or are 
estranged from our fellow citizens, perhaps we are compensated with ample 
peaceful seclusion as partial consolation.  What we lose in relations that instill 
traditional family and community values within us, perhaps we gain in an 
independent subscription to values and activities that better suit our personal 
preferences, unhindered by family or social group pressures.  Unfortunately, it 
has not worked out that way.  We have not created private enclaves within 
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which to examine the foundations of our personal identities in order to create 
ourselves afresh.  We have not heeded Rilke’s advice to “[g]o into 
yourself.”166  Rather, we attend to the images and messages of the mass media 
that largely drive us to consume.167  We are creatures of the market economy, 
buying through boom and bust, adorning ourselves with material goods that 
promise to salve our spirits.168  We have mistaken lock-step movement through 
advertising’s crafted ruts as personal progress.169  We are bombarded with 
pleas for our attention, from spam that congeals our web servers to 
telemarketers whose relentlessness prompts us to assume that incoming phone 
calls are unwanted.  The media that we hoped would open new worlds have 
been co-opted so that we are preoccupied with defending ourselves against 
them.170  The acceleration in media saturation has affected our physiology.  It 
appears that the neural networks of children are different than their parents.171  
In striking contrast to their parents, children’s brains are hardwired to multi-
task and seamlessly interact with their multiple computers.172  These youth 
may need a steady diet of electronic stimuli to satisfy their hyped-up neural 
networks. 
The unrelenting yammering of marketing techniques affects our self-
conception and our most intimate desires.  Spam and telephone solicitations 
are mechanisms in a larger consumerism that encourages us to view ourselves 
as the sum of what we own.  We express ourselves in the accumulation of 
mass-produced things.  The global complaint lodges against a market economy 
that impels us to consume and a mass media that maneuvers our tastes and 
preferences.  They both aim to squeeze contrary models from the realm of 
reasonable alternatives where one abstains from a cultivated compulsion to 
consume.  The particular complaint is that it is extremely difficult to escape the 
insinuation of mass marketing mechanisms.  The phones ring, the mailbox 
fills, the email account overflows, the television rants, and, consequently, our 
brain is cluttered with a behavioral model that fills all the available space.  It is 
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difficult to secure solitude when we carry the jingles of commerce deeply 
internalized within our consciousness.  We are satiated with the message to the 
degree that we cannot imagine a world, both as place and point of view, 
without it. 
Rilke said, “[e]verything is gestation and birthing.”173  He was endorsing 
the value of reflection upon the meaning of things that might span years and 
even decades before its significance could be appreciated.  It might require 
calm consideration, sustained over a lengthy period of time, to produce an 
important insight.  Solitude operates like dreams in this respect: it is the 
occasion for our brain to sort through the vagaries of everyday experience and 
identify themes and recognize meaning.  Many of us cannot function without 
dreams.174  Consistently repressed REM sleep can lead to temporary 
psychosis.175  The argument here is that we do not function well without 
periodic solitude and that we are systematically shrinking our capacity for 
solitude. 
D. Reserve 
It is not clear where the boundaries for our personal space, both physical 
and psychological, are anymore.  Reality shows, such as Jerry Springer, 
indicate a weakening of the instinct to preserve a private life, removed from 
the criticisms of those without knowledge of the broader, subtler context of 
that life.  Cell phone use, for example, is demonstrably without boundaries.  If 
we want to be available all the time (which we apparently do), then we take 
calls whenever they come, wherever we are.  The content of most of these 
conversations seems mundane, its banality outweighing the time and energy 
expended.  Indeed, most conversations seem more about social reassurance or 
expressions of tribal hierarchy than the conveyance of useful information, 
something like lesser primates picking lice off each other as a gesture of 
rapport.  However, content does periodically surface from the cell phone din 
and no subject is inappropriate.  The new convention for the practice allows 
the cell phone user to conduct himself as though he were isolated from others.  
He pretends that others do not hear his cell phone conversations, but, of course, 
they do.  Others pretend they have not heard the conversation, but, of course, 
they have. 
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Parents now can, and do, monitor the activities of their children and their 
children’s babysitters with very small video cameras.176  Parents are otherwise 
permitted to observe their children, but the babysitter does not expect to be 
recorded.  This practice has implications for solitude and intimacy, but it also 
raises reserve concerns.  Whatever respect we normally accord one another, to 
the effect that we accept each other at face value unless and until we have 
reason to do otherwise, the videotaping of babysitters is an example of how we 
are stretching exceptions to the norms of polite indifference. 
Parents, of course, have a right to protect their children,177 but we all have 
rights that can be impinged by others.  We radically alter the terms of our 
normal interactions with others if we insist upon a right to videotape these 
interactions.  What is especially interesting is that many who opt to videotape 
such transactions seem blind to the grounds for the objection, as though it 
merely expressed a peculiar idiosyncrasy.178  We do not stare at each other 
because that conduct would violate prevailing norms of civility and reserve, 
but if we can use a video camera to stare for us, at least some people are 
persuaded that the norm has not been violated. 
The key may be that technology transforms the norm because it abruptly 
reconfigures its shape and texture.  It is likely easier to act remotely than 
directly in many contexts and so what might feel objectionable in person feels 
unobjectionable from afar.  To the extent that some norms of reserve are built 
upon widely shared instincts, when the instinct is attenuated with a 
technological intermediary, the norms may weaken as the technology becomes 
widespread.  Reserve may be particularly susceptible to the effects of 
mediating technology because its norms can be somewhat vague and depend 
upon widely shared intuitions.  If technology weakens those intuitions, then the 
norm may lose its force.  The polite indifference that facilitates the interaction 
of many people in close places may be retooled in significant ways to 
accumulate new intuitions. 
Government, too, is constricting reserve’s boundaries.  The right to remain 
silent is engraved in our Constitution as a bold empowerment of the individual 
to resist the coercive force of government.179  It is not phrased to enable 
efficient law enforcement, but rather to recognize the special status of the 
person and appropriate privileges that should support that status.180  It would 
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appear that at least some of us are willing to reduce significantly the force of 
the right, at least in exigent circumstances.  An omen of the direct attack on the 
right to remain silent arose in the context of drinking and driving 
investigations.181  Driving has been determined to be a privilege allowed to 
citizens by the state and conditions can be imposed upon that privilege.182  
Thus, a license to drive can be revoked for failure to submit to a breathalyzer 
test or to perform field sobriety tests.183  In effect, testing is compelled for the 
accused because road safety has been judged to outweigh the right of the driver 
to not cooperate in providing evidence of his guilt.  There is widespread 
agreement that drunk driving offenses present a substantial hazard to the safety 
of others.  That agreement has been steadfastly managed by special interest 
groups, particularly Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), to make DUI a 
crime punishable by jail terms and conditions of probation comparable to 
serious felonies, like burglary and forgery.184  A consequence of the agreement 
is a diminishment of the right of the accused to remain silent when facing 
arrest and trial. 
There is a more recent diminishment that is more alarming.  The federal 
government relies upon the War on Terror to justify various law enforcement 
activities, which strain the traditional interpretation of protections provided by 
the Constitution to those accused of committing a crime.185  Most of the 
activities focus on individuals apprehended on foreign soil and charged with 
waging war against the United States.  Enemy combatants properly belong to a 
different category than United States citizens who have violated the law.  The 
rub is that some United States citizens charged with crimes that occurred in the 
United States are being prosecuted as though they were enemy combatants 
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seized abroad.186  The melding of categories is important because enemy 
combatants held at Guantanamo Bay may be subject to functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (“fMRI”), which are physical examinations that purport to 
provide foolproof evidence about the examinee relevant to whether they did 
the deeds for which they are charged.187 
An fMRI is a brain fingerprint that can “detect brain activity that is 
associated with particular kinds of recollection.”188  A suspect can be shown an 
image, such as a crime scene or a terrorist training camp, and the devise will 
detect whether he recognizes the image, or if he has been in that location 
before.189  This is an extremely powerful truth and lie detector device that does 
not require that the examinee answer questions.  The cooperation required 
from the examinee is minimal.  However, it seems clear that the use of fMRI is 
an invasion of the privileged mental life of the examinee.  It is also clear that 
the technology is very effective and that its effectiveness will argue for its 
selective use in important cases.  Of course, the boundaries of selective use 
may be difficult to firmly demarcate. 
Arguments for the use of torture in exceptional cases, such as when a 
madman knows where a dirty bomb that will kill hundreds of thousands of 
innocents is located, are standard fare for utilitarian calculations of correct 
conduct.  These thought experiments drive us to accept that torture is 
acceptable at some extreme tradeoff in what it accomplishes and then, having 
stepped onto the slippery slope, ratchets back from the tipping instance to less 
obvious cases.  It is likely that fMRI will follow that precedent.  We know 
already that the relaxed standards for criminal procedures that were passed into 
law in order to more effectively pursue international terrorism, such as the U.S. 
PATRIOT Act,190 are being used in domestic investigations.191  If fMRI is 
appropriate to address the threat of foreign terrorism, why should we resist its 
use with domestic terrorists or individuals suspected of heinous crimes?  It is 
doubtful that the right to remain silent will survive uncompromised if the 
government can impose fMRI examinations in special circumstances.  The 
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Constitution’s conception of the person and the privileges to which she is 
entitled will be diminished pro rata as well. 
E. Privacy 
Privacy provides us with the time and tools to sort through our experiences 
and construct a coherent life’s narrative.  We do not immediately know how to 
evaluate our experiences, especially those that are unfamiliar to us.192  Without 
a sense of ourselves separate from the flow of events and people around us and 
the prevailing evaluation of what they mean, we are inclined to adopt the 
prevailing view as our own.193  Privacy fuels the formation of a self that is 
distinct from the rush of events and exchanges, which entices an unthinking 
conformity.194  We would otherwise lose a sense of ourselves as beings 
choosing a life’s course in the constant immediacy of the present. 
We are intrinsically social beings.195  Aristotle nominated us political 
beings,196 which raises the ante somewhat to assert a need to interact with 
others in order to govern ourselves.  As a species, we cannot provide for 
ourselves until many years after birth without the active assistance of others.  
Beyond this physical dependence upon others for the necessaries of life, we are 
also dependent upon others for the criteria with which we assess meaning in 
our lives.197  We are cultural beings and do not generate criteria de novo, but 
depend upon inherited standards with which we measure ourselves or against 
which we rebel.198 
It is not necessary to specify exactly how humans accommodate their 
social natures to make the point that, inevitably, we make sense of our lives 
while living in communites with others.  Privacy is a fundamental prerequisite 
for that search for meaning.199  Various psychologists, philosophers, and 
theologians address the particulars of the search and we need not quibble with 
the contrasting emphases of the varying elaborations.200  It is sufficient to 
highlight some key features of that search to make it evident that the process of 
personal growth depends upon privacy as a condition for its progress. 
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The human species is remarkably malleable.201  We acclimate to extreme 
varieties of weather and geology throughout the world.  We also accommodate 
to widely varying social conditions.  We have lived and prospered in small, 
remote bands.  We manage to build purposeful lives amid the tumult of large, 
congested cities.  We adapt to repressive, authoritarian regimes where thugs 
rule arbitrarily, and we adjust to colonial rule where distant, unseen powers 
dictate policy for people unlike themselves.  In these often dysfunctional 
circumstances, the human species manages to survive.  The malleability is 
sometimes frightening.  We are capable of turning on our neighbors when our 
own survival seems dependent upon that betrayal.  The Milgram experiments 
surprised even the test administrators by demonstrating a willingness to inflict 
pain on innocent others, if the infliction was sanctioned by appropriately 
attired and mannered authorities.202 
There are numerous instances where individuals have joined cults and 
subjected themselves to the often bizarre or self-destructive mandates of the 
cult.  Cult leaders frequently pursue brainwashing techniques to persuade 
neophyte members to take up the cult’s cause in earnest.203  Whether structured 
or haphazard, a consistent tactic in the reinforcement of the cult’s solidarity is 
the elimination of privacy.204  It is important to control the schedule of cult 
members to reduce their opportunities to discuss the indoctrination 
procedures.205  Indeed, cults encourage their members to report on each 
other.206  There are no truly private conversations because everyone is charged 
to report anything irregular to the cult leadership.207 
We are not inevitably independent thinkers.  We are not teleologically 
promised ever-increasing person freedoms.  We possess qualities as a species 
that strongly suggest a deeply rooted interest in, and perhaps a need for, self-
expression.  We seem to prefer forms of government that cultivate a mutual 
respect and support for self-expression, though this is a more speculative 
claim.  However, we should not presume that enhanced self-expression for 
maximally many people is our ineluctable future.  We have proven resilient 
during our limited time on this planet, but part of that resilience is explained by 
our ability to suffer through hardship and deprivation for long periods of time.  
This includes centuries that were not conducive to personal freedom and self-
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expression.  The best means to promote a future that supports personal freedom 
for maximally many people involves the protection of the conditions precedent 
for a consciousness that strives for personal freedom and recognizes its value 
for others.  It is only by enabling the development of persons who can reflect 
upon the meaning of their lives and associate with others to advance that 
understanding and support its expression that a program to promote personal 
freedom makes sense.  It is not sufficient to remove obstacles and shout 
encouragement to credibly make a claim that personal freedoms flourish.  
Individuals, not external constraints or the lack thereof, are the loci of personal 
freedom.  Unless individuals have the resources and the motivation to express 
their freedoms, those freedoms exist only as abstract entities.  Without a sense 
of self and judgment about what matters to that self, there is no substance to a 
roster of personal freedoms. 
We are simultaneously resilient and fragile.  For all that science tells us, it 
cannot tell us the meaning of our lives.  That question is beyond its ken.  We 
are charged with identifying meaning for ourselves, however tenuous and 
fleeting our conclusions may be.  However difficult the search and however 
elusive the answer, it is a responsibility charged to each of us individually to 
undertake the search.  We conduct the search among others and we rely on 
their guidance and encouragement to persist in this venture.  Each of us has 
direct access to only our own consciousness and each of us must secure a 
unique reading of the meaning of our life.  That reading is genuine only if it 
results from a deliberation that feeds heavily on the resources of privacy. 
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